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Abstract
We propose an axiom that we call Agreement to deal with changing preferences
and derive its empirical implications. The resulting revealed preference condition
generalises GARP when preferences are different but preferences in one context are
informative about preferences in another context. We apply this idea to a social
choice experiment, where a player can respond to another player being kind or
relatively unkind. We find that people have a consistent preferences for each case,
but that preferences depend on the kindness of the other player, and that subjects
act in line with Agreement. We thus provide support for modelling and interpreting
responses to the intentions of other players as a preference for reciprocity.
∗Erasmus University Rotterdam, heufer@ese.eur.nl
†Tilburg University, p.vanbruggen@uvt.nl
‡Australian National University, jingni.yang@anu.edu.au
1 Introduction
Many economic decisions are made in a social context. Transactions often involve re-
peated interactions with owners, managers, employees, suppliers, service providers, or
consumers. In such situations, reciprocity can play an important role. Reciprocity refers
to a tendency of responding in kind to behaviour or the perceived intention behind that
behaviour. This can sustain cooperation or conflict where this would not occur otherwise.
It introduces path dependency into choice settings: the evaluation of an alternative will
depend on how pleasant or unpleasant previous interactions were.
Considerable evidence has been found for reciprocal behaviour. Blount (1995) and
Falk et al. (2008) find with experimental data that subjects give less to or even reduce
the payoff of another player if this player rather than a randomisation device gives them
a low endowment. Falk et al. (2003) find that in an ultimatum game, the same offer is
more likely to be rejected if more equitable allocations could have been chosen by the
proposer than if the proposer could only have offered less equitable allocations. In a lab
experiment, Charness (2004) finds that employees exert more effort when they are paid
a higher wage by an employer, and that they exert particularly low effort if a low wage
is set by the employer rather than by a randomisation device or the experimenter. In a
field experiment, Cohn et al. (2015) similarly find that paying a higher wage increased
performance of workers performing a one-time job. Dohmen et al. (2009) find evidence for
reciprocity in a representative survey, and find that, in line with experimental findings,
reciprocity is correlated with wages and employment. Falk et al. (2018) find evidence of
reciprocity in a large representative sample of 76 countries, and find that it is correlated
with the frequency of armed conflict.
Findings of reciprocal behaviour are often interpreted and modelled as reflecting a
preference, an approach Sobel (2005) calls intrinsic reciprocity. Whether or not reci-
procity is a preference has important implications. If reciprocity is intrinsic, we can use
the revealed preference methodology or the utility maximisation paradigm to learn about
reciprocal behaviour. It has major implications for welfare analysis: if preferences are re-
ciprocal, i.e. depend on previous interactions (apart from their effect on final allocations),
then people essentially have different preference relations depending on the kindness of
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the other player. This complicates welfare analysis, as it is not obvious according to
which preference relation we should judge welfare. A method such as the one proposed
by Bernheim and Rangel (2007) must then be used for welfare analysis.
Previous modelling efforts (e.g. Rabin 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004; Falk
and Fischbacher 2006; Segal and Sobel 2007) have focused mostly on the game-theoretical
implications of reciprocity, rather than on measuring and comparing preferences. As a
consequence, they make specific functional form assumptions about important unobserv-
ables such as the utility function and notions of fairness. Tests of these models are
simultaneously tests of their parametric assumptions. Because the assumptions are made
for tractability, not realism, they are likely to lead to violations even if people have recip-
rocal preferences. As Sobel (2005, p. 395) writes, “Rejecting a model is easy, rejecting
an approach is nearly impossible.”
In this paper, we focus on the simplest hypothesis generated by the notion of intrinsic
reciprocity for which it is possible to design a test with the power to reject the hypothesis:
if reciprocity is a preference, there should exist a preference relation according to which
people make social choices, and this preference relation should be different depending
on how kind or unkind another person is perceived to have been. We test this in an
experiment which is similar in spirit to Andreoni and Miller (2002), with subjects making
choices in a modified dictator game where the price of giving varies between tasks. This
allows us to test for the existence of preference relations that fit with observed choices.
Furthermore, we introduce an axiom to relate different preference relations. Reci-
procity suggests behaviour changes in a particular direction depending on how kind an-
other person has been. Our axiom gives empirical meaning to the idea that one is more
or less generous depending on the behaviour of another person. The revealed preference
condition we derive requires no assumptions about the functional form of the utility func-
tion or how people code behaviour as kind or unkind. We show the existence of utility
functions, one of which is more selfish than the other in line with the axiom we propose,
if and only if the revealed preference condition is satisfied.
The concept underlying our axiom is that two preference relations, one of which is
less selfish, agree on particular allocations. Specifically, if some allocation x is preferred
to some allocation y according to the more selfish preferences, even though allocation y
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gives the decision maker more than allocation x, then x should also be preferred to y
according to the more altruistic preferences. As the purely selfish motive would suggest
picking y over x, choosing x means allocation y is too selfish even according to the
more selfish preference relation and x should certainly be preferred to y according to the
more altruistic preference relation. This Agreement axiom captures that while different
perceptions of others’ intentions may make people more or less selfish, it should not affect
how they trade off fairness and efficiency.
Many behavioural findings besides reciprocity show behaviour is sensitive to changes
in the choice environment that do not directly affect final outcomes, such as framing or the
salience of alternatives. The Agreement axiom and its revealed preference condition can
be used to model such behaviour in a very general way. Although the explanation above
interprets preferences as more or less selfish in response to more or less kind behaviour,
it can be applied generally whenever one preference relation likes one good more or less
depending on the choice situation.
We test the revealed preference implications of our axiom in an experiment. We find
that choices are indeed different depending on the behaviour of another person, that these
choices can be modelled as a preference, and that they largely satisfy Agreement. This
evidence suggests reciprocity is at least partially intrinsic.
2 Agreement
2.1 Preferences
Suppose a decision maker has two preference relations for allocations of money for herself
and someone else. For interpretation, we assume the other to always be the same person.
Let X = R2+ be the preference domain and for all z = (z1, z2) ∈ X, let z1 be the money
amount she gives to herself and z2 be the money amount for the other person. Let
P = R2++1 be the set of all prices. The decision maker is characterised by a pair of
preference relations (%A, %S) on X. The preference relation %A reflects a more altruistic
1We take the convention that R2+ = {x ∈ R2 : x1 ≥ 0 and x2 ≥ 0} and R2++ = {x ∈ R2 : x1 >
0 and x2 > 0}.
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self and %S a more selfish self. Both preference relations are complete and transitive.
‘Altruistic’ and ‘selfish’ are taken as relative terms here; the selfish set of preferences need
not be perfectly selfish.2
The decision maker faces two contexts to make choices, which we call context A and
context S, where the decision maker is expected to be more altruistic in context A than in
context S, for example for reasons of reciprocity. The following axiom gives the relation
between these two preference relations.
Axiom 1 (Agreement). For all x, y ∈ X with x = (x1, x2) and y = (y1, y2),
[x %S (S) y and x1 ≤ y1] implies x %A (A) y.
Intuitively, Agreement states that if the decision maker (strictly) prefers x to y when
choosing according to %S, and she keeps less for herself in choice x than y, then she also
(strictly) prefers x to y according to the more altruistic preferences (%A).3 An equivalent
formulation is presented in Proposition 1 (all proofs are in the Appendix).
Proposition 1. The Agreement axiom is equivalent to the condition that for all x, y ∈ X
with x = (x1, x2) and y = (y1, y2), [x %A (A) y and x1 ≥ y1] implies x %S (A) y.
2.2 Empirical Implications of Agreement for Revealed Prefer-
ences
We start this section with a review of basic concepts of revealed preferences.
Definition 1. A set of observations Ω is a finite collection of pairs {(zi, ri)}ki=1 ⊂ X×P.
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2, given the choice set {zi ∈ R2+ :
2Of course, a decision maker may have more than two preference relations. As the interest of this
paper is in comparing preferences, we limit the analysis to two preference relations, but multiple such
comparisons can be made between any number of preference relations.
3Agreement is in the same spirit as the MAT relation in Cox et al. (2008). If one preference relation
is MAT (more altruistic than) the other preference relation according to their definition then they satisfy








2 ≤ 1}. We use superscripts to indicate observations and subscripts to in-
dicate coordinates.
We now define the revealed preference relations on Ω. We say that zi is directly revealed
preferred to z, written as ziR0z, if pizi ≥ piz; it is indirectly revealed preferred to z, writ-
ten as ziRz, if there exist zi1 , zi2 , · · · , zim ∈ Ω such that ziR0zi1R0zi2R0 · · ·R0zimR0z.
We use P 0 (P ) to denote the strict preference relation: zi is strictly directly revealed
preferred to z, written ziP 0z, if pizi > piz. We say zi is strictly revealed preferred to z,
written ziP z, if there exist zi1 , zi2 , · · · , zim ∈ Ω such that ziR0zi1R0zi2R0 · · ·R0zimR0z
and at least one of these revealed preference relations is strict.
Definition 2. A utility function u : X → R rationalises a set of observations Ω if
u(zi) ≥ u(zj) whenever ziRzj.
Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982) provide an easily testable condition which is necessary
and sufficient for the existence of a utility function that rationalises a set of observations.
Axiom 2 (GARP). A set of observations Ω satisfies the Generalised Axiom of Revealed
Preference (GARP) if for all ziRzj not zjP 0zi.
Varian (1982) provides a construction of a utility function that rationalises Ω when Ω
satisfies GARP. We use the following representation that can be derived directly from
Varian (1982) (a proof is in the Appendix).
Proposition 2. A set of observations Ω satisfies GARP if and only if there exists a
continuous, strictly increasing and quasiconcave utility function u that rationalises Ω
where u((a, a)) = a for all a ∈ R.
In our model, we have two sets of observations, one from context A and the other from
context S, denoted by ΩA = {xi, pi}ni=1 and ΩS = {yj, qj}mj=1. Let RA and RS be the
revealed preference relation on ΩA and ΩS respectively. If Agreement holds then the
observations ΩA (ΩS) reveal information about %S (%A). We explain this point with
Figure 1.
In the left image, given the budget line in context A, the decision maker chooses xi, so
xi is revealed preferred to all allocations on and below the budget line in context A. Every



























yj is chosen in context S
Figure 1: Revealed preference implications of the Agreement axiom. The observations
are revealed preferred to the area below the budget line in the same context and to the
area indicated with the vertical lines in the other context.
than xi does. Thus, by Agreement, xi is also revealed preferred to the allocations in the
area indicated by the red vertical lines in context S. In the right graph, the decision maker
chooses yj in context S, and any allocation in the area indicated with the blue vertical
lines gives the decision maker more than yj does. Thus, by Agreement, she should also
prefer yj over any allocation in the blue area in context A.
Through Agreement we can thus extend the revealed relation RA by incorporating
information from ΩS and extend RS by incorporating information from ΩA. Let Ω =
ΩA∪ΩS = {zi, ri}ki=1 = {xi, pi}ni=1∪{yj, qj}mi=1, where (zi, ri) is an observation from either







j and zi1 ≤ z
j





j or if ziR0Az
j and zi1 ≥ z
j
1. P̃ A and P̃ S
are defined analogously. We next define rationalisation in our model.
Definition 3. An altruistic utility function u : X → R and a selfish utility function
v : X → R Agreement-rationalise (AG-rationalise) Ω, if u(zi) ≥ u(zj) whenever ziR̃Azj
and if v(zi) ≥ v(zj) whenever ziR̃Szj.
The altruistic and selfish utility functions represent the extended revealed preference
relations inferred from the observations Ω. AG-rationalisation captures what it means to
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choose according to one’s preferences if these preferences satisfy Agreement.
Axiom 3 (AG-GARP). A set of observations Ω satisfies Agreement-GARP (AG-GARP),
if ziR̃Az








Theorem 1. Given a set of observations Ω = ΩA ∪ ΩS with ΩA = {xi, pi}ni=1 and ΩS =
{yj, qj}mj=1, the following conditions are equivalent:
(a) The set of observations Ω satisfies AG-GARP.
(b) There exist an altruistic utility function u and selfish utility function v that are con-
tinuous, strictly increasing and quasiconcave and AG-rationalise Ω. Moreover, for
all x, y ∈ X, u(x) ≥ u(y) with x1 ≥ y1 implies that v(x) ≥ v(y) and for all x, y ∈ X,
v(x) ≥ v(y) with x1 ≤ y1 implies that u(x) ≥ u(y).
Theorem 1 describes that if the set of observations satisfies AG-GARP, the decision
maker’s choices can be represented by two utility functions, one of which is more altruis-
tic than the other. These two utility functions represent the extended revealed preference














Figure 2: AG-GARP predicts that a third choice on the dashed red budget line must be
on the thick red part.
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We can use AG-GARP to predict choices. This is illustrated in Figure 2. xi is chosen
in context A and yj is chosen in context S. Suppose a person is next presented with the
dashed red budget in context S. A person who chooses according to preferences which
satisfy AG-GARP must then choose on the thick red part of the budget line. Choosing to
keep more violates GARP within context S (and therefore violates AG-GARP); choosing
to keep less violates Agreement.4 Thus, we get predictions beyond that choices must be
different or that the decision maker must keep more in the selfish context on the same
budget.
We get clear welfare implications from AG-GARP using the behavioural welfare defi-
nitions of Bernheim and Rangel (2007). They define an alternative x to be a strict indi-
vidual welfare improvement over an alternative y if a decision maker sometimes chooses
x but never y, or never chooses either, when x and y are both available. When ziP Sz
and zi1 ≤ z1, we have ziP̃ Az and ziP̃ Sz. A decision maker who satisfies AG-GARP will
then never choose z over zi, hence zi is a strict individual welfare improvement over z.
Similarly, if ziP Az and z
i
1 ≥ z1, we have ziP̃ Az and ziP̃ Sz and zi is a strict individual
welfare improvement over z for a decision maker who satisfies AG-GARP.
Although we have assumed that we have a dataset from context A where the decision
maker is more altruistic and a dataset from context S where the decision maker is more
selfish, it is not essential that we know for sure in which context the decision maker is
more altruistic. If we want to model changing preferences without specifying in which
context the preferences should be more or less altruistic we can let the data speak for
itself (if we have two distinct sets of data). Satisfying Agreement means violations of
GARP can only go in one direction (see Figure 8 in the Appendix). We can use this to
infer from the data which is context A and which is context S. If two observations from
two different contexts violate GARP, then the observation where the decision maker keeps
less must come from context A, and hence all observations from that set must belong to
ΩA, as illustrated by the left image of Figure 3. If we do not wish to assume which set of
observations is more altruistic, we can also still test for AG-GARP: AG-GARP is then
violated if we find violations of GARP that go in different directions. This is illustrated
4Such predictions can easily be extended to situations where a person does not choose in perfect































Cannot be rationalised with Agreement
Figure 3: Identifying contexts (preference relations) and testing AG-GARP without as-
suming which context is A or S.
by the right image of Figure 3 for two sets of observations, {hi, hj} and {gn, gm}. The
violation of GARP by hi and gm suggests the set {gn, gm} must come from the more
selfish context, but the violation of GARP by hj and gn suggests {hn, hm} must be the
observations from the more selfish context. This violates AG-GARP no matter which set
of observations is taken as the more selfish one.
In our setting, a decision maker has preferences over X = R2+ and every point in X is
taken as an allocation of money. The preference domain X can have other interpretations.
For example, x = (x1, x2) ∈ X can be consumption and leisure, and a person may prefer
leisure (good 1) more when they are older than younger, or more in the summer than in
the winter. Our method can be applied very generally.
3 Experiment
3.1 Experiment design
To measure how social preferences depend on the perceived kindness of another person we
ran an interactive experiment where pairs of subjects made choices. One player made a
single Choice (hence we call this player ‘player C’ or simply ‘C’) between two allocations:
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either giving e13 to the other player and keeping e27 or giving e18 and keeping e18.
In our experiment, these two possibilities represent the contexts A and S that the second
player faced. Using the strategy method, the second player made 14 choices from 14
linear Budgets (hence, we call this player ‘player B’) for each of these two contexts (thus
making a total of 28 choices). For the purposes of this paper, we are only interested in
the choices made by player B. Player C was only part of the experiment to incentivise
player B.
Crucially, both players were informed that only one choice would be implemented for
real: either the choice of the first player (C) would be implemented or one of the choices
of player B would be implemented. In the latter case, one budget would be randomly
selected from the set of budgets corresponding to the choice made by C. Thus, Player B’s
choice was only practically relevant as a response to C’s intention, never to a practically
implemented choice by C.
Player C was informed that player B could divide money between them at different
rates, that the minimum B could give them was e0 and that the maximum differed per
budget but was never more than e60. Player C was informed that B made 14 choices
for both of C’s possible choices. Player B was informed that player C was presented with
this information. Both players were informed how they would be matched to each other
and were informed about the payment procedure, including that both players would be
paid either according to C’s choice or to one of B’s choices and that this was determined
randomly.
After the instructions, both player B and player C were asked to answer three multiple
choice comprehension questions. If they answered a question incorrectly they were given
immediate feedback as to why their answer was wrong. They could only continue once
they had answered the question correctly. Player B was also given some practice tasks to
familiarise them with the interface.5
Player C could indicate their choice simply by selecting the desired allocation and
confirming their choice (they could revise their choice before confirming). The order of
the alternatives was randomised and the same in the instructions and in the actual choice
5Player C was not provided with practice tasks because their task was a very simple binary choice















































Figure 4: Budgets used in the experiment
The 14 budgets player B was faced with in each context (shown in Figure 4) were
all linear budgets where B could give some money to C at different rates, from giving
C e0.33 to giving C e3 for every euro B gave up. The minimum B could keep was
always e0, as was the minimum B could give away to C. The maximum amount B could
keep or give to C varied by budget and was never higher than e48, respectively e60.
Budgets were chosen such that they intersected at many points to get good test power.
The average slope was bigger than 1, meaning that on average giving up e1 increased C’s
payoff by more than e1, to make it attractive for player B to give at least some money
to C (if all choices are on the axis, test power is zero).
Which of the contexts (player C’s two possible choices) for which player B made
choices from budgets was presented first was randomised at the start of the experiment
and then kept the same in the instructions and in the choice tasks. The order of the
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14 budgets was randomised for each of the contexts separately, so that the order of the
budgets was different between the two contexts.
Figure 5: A screenshot of the interface for one of the player B’s tasks.
To make performing the tasks as easy as possible for player B we developed an interface
which graphically displayed the budget (shown in Figure 5). Player B could make choices
by clicking on any point on the budget, by typing the amount they wanted to keep, or by
typing the amount they wanted to give to player C. When either of these three methods
had been used, a dot would appear on the budget line to indicate their choice and the
amounts that player C and B would receive were displayed automatically in number
fields. Player B could then revise their choice if they were not happy with the resulting
allocation by clicking somewhere else on the budget line, by dragging the dot around on
the budget line, or by entering in a different number in either of the fields displaying how
much they would keep or give away.
The software automatically calculated a minimum step size in multiples of e0.05 and
any choice was automatically converted to the closest step. This ensured that all choices
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were exactly on the budget line. For example, where player B could give away e3 for
every e1 they gave up, the minimum amount B could give up other than 0 was e0.05 and
the minimum amount they could give away other than 0 was e0.15. Giving up e0.03 or
giving away e0.10 to C was automatically rounded to giving up e0.05 and giving away
e0.15. Entering an amount not on the budget line (negative amounts or amounts greater
than the maximum amount that could be kept or given to C) resulted in a message
indicating that the amount entered was invalid. Player B could only continue to the next
task after choosing a valid allocation.
On entering the lab, subjects were assigned a cubicle and asked to wait for the start
of the experiment (if there was an odd number of subjects the last subject to arrive was
given a show-up fee and did not participate). At the start of the experiment, subjects
were handed an envelope containing two slips of paper containing their subject ID. After
using their subject ID to log on, we collected their envelopes, leaving one of their IDs at
their cubicle, and sorted them into one pile containing player C IDs and one containing
player B IDs. Subjects who finished early were then asked to randomly match players by
choosing an envelope from each pile (without seeing the ID codes within) and to put the
ID code of player B into the envelope containing the ID of player C. Next, subjects were
asked to roll a die to determine whether each pair would be paid according to player C
or player B’s choice (where the probability of C or B being selected was equal). This was
marked on the envelope. If the pair was paid according to B’s choice, a subject was asked
to draw a ball from a bag with 14 balls numbered 1 to 14 inclusive to select according to
which budget the pair would be paid out. This too was marked on the envelope. When
all subjects had finished subjects were asked one by one to come to the front desk to be
paid.
The experiment was run in the ESE-econlab of Erasmus University Rotterdam. There
were 9 sessions of roughly 20 subjects each, with a total of 170 subjects participating.
The experiment lasted about an hour and the average payment was e16.47.
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4 Analysis
In this section, we first show a few descriptive statistics for the different treatments. We
then present our analysis of the data based on the revealed preference approach outlined
in Section 2, and finally we present the results of more conventional parametric analysis
assuming a CES utility function.
4.1 Descriptives
Player C chose the more selfish allocation (e27 for themselves, e13 for player B) roughly
as often as the more equal allocation (e18, e18), with frequencies of 55% and 45%,
respectively. This shows both options were attractive to player C, which is important
because if one option was very unattractive and therefore unlikely to be chosen, this case
would not be well-incentivised for player B.
Table 1: Choices by players B conditional on the choice by C.
C kind C unkind
Self Other Share self Self Other Share self
(e) (e) (%) (e) (e) (%)
Min 5 0 18.9 6 0 25.0
Median 19 10 70.4 22 6.90 78.3
Max 48 40 100 48 32.25 100
Throughout the analysis, we will treat player C choosing e27 for themselves and
e13 for player B as player C being (relatively) unkind, and player C choosing e18 for
themselves and player B as C being (relatively) kind. Table 1 shows various statistics
on the choices of players B conditional on the choice by player C. The median choice
gave away about 30% of their endowment to player C if C is kind, and about 22% if C is
unkind. The median amount kept by player B was about e3 higher and B gave C about
e3 less if C is unkind. These differences are all significant with p-values < 0.001 according
to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.6 Player B is thus less generous when C chooses allocation
6This is true both when we take each individual choice as an observation, and when we take the
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(e27, e13) than when C chooses (e18, e18), consistent with reciprocity if we code the
former as being a less kind action. For the budgets with a price of 1, corresponding to
the classic dictator game, the share of what was kept is 67.8% when C is kind and 77.3%
when C is unkind.
4.2 Revealed preference analysis
In our analysis, we only use the data of player B’s choices. We first present the revealed
preference analysis. We take the set of player B’s choices responding to player C’s possible
selfish choice of keeping e27 and giving e13 as context S and the set of player B’s choices
responding to player C’s possible more altruistic choice of keeping e18 and giving e18
as context A. Based on Proposition 2 and Theorem 1, we have the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. Player B has different preferences in both contexts: %A 6=%S . This im-
plies the following testable conditions: GARP holds on ΩA and on ΩS, but not on Ω.
Hypothesis 1 is the simplest hypothesis generated by reciprocal preferences: people
choose according to some (social) preference relation, but this preference relation is differ-
ent depending on how kind another player has been. This requires GARP to be satisfied
on the data from each separately, as otherwise people are not maximising any utility
function, but not on the data together, meaning behaviour is not consistent with people
maximising the same utility function in both contexts.
Hypothesis 2. Player B has different preferences in each context, which are connected
by Agreement. Player B uses preferences %A in context A and %S in context S. Testable
condition: AG-GARP holds on Ω, with the choices from ΩS being more selfish.
This second hypothesis captures that reciprocal preferences have a direction: we ex-
pect a person to be more generous when the recipient has been more kind. The Agree-
ment axiom as captured by AG-GARP gives empirical meaning to being more generous
(or more selfish) for budgets with different prices and endowments (see Section 2).
As satisfying GARP is a binary variable, where one either satisfies it or does not and
minor and economically unimportant violations of GARP are treated the same as very
average per subject as an observation.
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significant violations, we use Afriat’s Critical Cost Efficiency Index (CCEI) (Afriat, 1972)
instead. This captures how far away someone’s choices are from utility maximisation. The
index is bounded between 0 and 1. When choices satisfy GARP, the index is 1. When
GARP is violated, the index is smaller than 1, with bigger violations (relative to the
budget) resulting in lower indices. We construct a similar index for AG-GARP, which we
call the Agreement Efficiency Index (AGEI) or simply Agreement efficiency.




















Figure 6: Empirical CDFs of CCEI (efficiency) for context A (blue), S (red) and a mixture
of choices from A and S (grey).
Figure 6 shows empirical cumulative distribution functions of CCEIs for choices made
in context A (in blue) and S (red). The distributions are very similar, which means
subjects came equally close to utility maximisation in either treatment. A Wilcoxon
signed-rank test (used throughout this section) cannot reject that the distributions are
the same (p-value 0.703). The grey line in Figure 6 shows CCEIs when combining choices
from half the budgets in context A with choices the same subject made from the remaining
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budgets in context S.7 These efficiencies are calculated based on the same budgets and
the same number of choices, hence power is the same. The lower efficiencies observed
here (p-value < 0.001 compared to either A or S) are evidence that preferences revealed
in context A and S are different. Because preferences differ between the two contexts,
revealed preferences are contradictory, which leads to violations of GARP and low CCEIs
when we treat them as if they come from the maximisation of a single utility function.




















Figure 7: Empirical CDFs of the minimum CCEI from context A and S (yellow), Agree-
ment efficiency over set A and S (green), Agreement efficiency with set A and S reversed
(brown) and Agreement efficiency over observations from A of two different subjects
(grey).
Now that it has been established that revealed preferences are different between con-
text A and S we investigate whether these different revealed preferences can be connected
7There are many different ways to select these budgets. The grey line in Figure 6 is the mean of
CCEIs calculated across these different combinations.
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with Agreement. In Figure 7 the empirical cumulative distribution function of Agreement
efficiencies (taking the preference relation from the kind treatment as the more altruistic
one) is presented in green, together with the empirical distribution function of the mini-
mum Afriat efficiency of context A and S (yellow). The latter is an upper bound on the
Agreement efficiency: any violation of GARP in either A or S is also a violation of AG-
GARP.8 As we can see, the distributions of Agreement efficiencies and Afriat efficiencies
are very close, so Agreement fits behaviour very well. The brown line shows Agreement
efficiencies when we take the data from the unkind treatment as the more altruistic data
and the data from the kind treatment as the more selfish data. Agreement efficiencies
are then clearly lower (p-value < 0.001) than the Agreement efficiencies of the green line,
which is evidence that indeed people become more generous in response to a kind action
by another person.
One possible explanation for the small difference between Agreement and Afriat effi-
ciencies is that we may have little power to reject AG-GARP. Revealed preference condi-
tions are very general and therefore tend to be rather permissive, meaning that we may
not detect violations of them even if the decision maker does not satisfy the conditions.
The decrease in Agreement efficiencies when we reverse the altruistic and selfish data
shows that the condition is not so weak that is unlikely to detect violations. This is a
somewhat extreme case, taking data where average giving is lower as the more altruistic
data. Therefore Figure 7 also presents (in grey) Agreement efficiencies calculated taking
the choices of one subject from context A and the choices of another subject from the
same context.9
We do not expect the altruistic choices of one subject to be a more selfish version of
the choices by another subject, so we expect to detect violations of AG-GARP if AG-
GARP is sufficiently demanding. The Agreement efficiencies of the grey line in Figure
7 are clearly much worse (p-value < 0.001), so the good performance of Agreement is
8For this reason, the difference is almost necessarily statistically significant (p-value < 0.001).
9Because the issue here is that two different conditions are tested (GARP and AG-GARP) rather
than that the number of budgets differs (as in Figure 6) we cannot simply correct for the number of
budgets. There are many ways to match one subject to another subject; we report the mean taken over
the Agreement efficiencies calculated for every possible match.
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not due to a lack of power, but simply because it describes behaviour well. There is a
direction to how preferences change depending on the kindness of the other person, and
this can be captured with Agreement.
4.3 Parametric analysis
The Agreement axiom can also be used with parametric assumptions. In this section, we
perform parametric analysis to complement the revealed preference analysis of Section 4.2.
We do so for constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility functions. The Agreement
axiom has an intuitive interpretation for CES utility functions, which have the following
form:




Here z ∈ X is an allocation. Parameter ρ determines the elasticity of substitution, that
is, the curvature of the indifference curves. Thus ρ determines the trade-off between
equality and efficiency. Parameter α is the distribution parameter, and captures how
the payoff to the decision maker is traded off against the payoff of the other person. If






for %A and v(z) = (αSz
ρS
1 + (1− αS)z
ρS
2 )
1/ρS for %S, the hypotheses parallel to those of
our revealed preference analysis are the following (the proof is in the Appendix).
Hypothesis 3. Player B has different preferences in each context, which are connected
by Agreement. Testable parametric implication:
αA ≤ αS and ρA = ρS.
Following Andreoni and Miller (2002), we estimate CES functions for each individual
for both treatments. With the budget constraint z1 + pz2 = m the demand function is
z1(p,m) =
[α/(1− α)]1/(1−ρ)





Where r = −ρ/(1 − ρ) and D = [α/(1 − α)]1/(1−ρ). We first estimate r and D by
non-linear least squares, then back out estimations of α and ρ.
For only 59 out of the 85 player B we can fit the CES utility function. Twelve subjects
make all choices on one axis (in all cases keeping everything) in either treatment and are
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therefore excluded, leaving 73 subjects. Additionally, the estimation for 14 player Bs does
not converge because they chose on the axis except once or twice in each treatment, or
they always chose proportionally in one treatment (the ratio of the money amount player
B keeps relative to the amount they give is constant).
The median α̂ and ρ̂ for both contexts are reported in Table 2: α̂ is bigger when player
C chooses the less generous allocation than when C chooses the more generous allocation.
A Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicates that this difference is significant (p-value 0.033).
By contrast, the difference in ρ̂ between the two contexts is not significant (p-value 0.188).
This is in accordance with hypothesis 3.
Table 2: Summary of Wilcoxon Signrank Test
Context A Context S p-value
Median α̂ 0.85 0.98 0.033
Median ρ̂ -0.91 -1.00 0.188
5 Discussion
For budgets with a price of 1, corresponding to the classic dictator game, we find that
our player B keeps 67.8% when C is kind and 77.3% when C is unkind, meaning they give
away 27.4% of their endowment on average. This is close to giving in the typical dictator
game at 28.3% (Engel, 2011). The share that is given away in either of our treatments
separately (32.2% for the kind and 22.7% for the unkind treatment) is also well within
the range of typical observations (cf. Engel, 2011, p. 589).
Like Andreoni and Miller (2002) we find that subjects largely satisfy utility max-
imisation or come very close to maximising utility when making social choices on linear
budgets. We find more violations of GARP, which can be explained by the greater num-
ber of budgets we use (14 in either context rather than 8). The Afriat efficiencies we find
are slightly higher than those found in the social choice experiment with linear budgets
by Fisman et al. (2007), who find that only 54% of subject achieve an efficiency of 1
compared to around 74% of our subjects, which again is probably due to a difference in
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the number of budgets (50 in the case of Fisman et al., 2007).
Many studies have reported findings of reciprocal behaviour (as briefly discussed in
the Introduction). Some studies (e.g. Reuben and Suetens, 2012; Cabral et al., 2014) have
also looked into the frequency of behaviour consistent with a strategic motive relative to
the frequency of behaviour without a strategic motive. However, none of these studies test
whether their findings are consistent with a preference for reciprocity, which requires that
concerns for reciprocity can be expressed as a a well-behaved preference ordering. Testing
this hypothesis is only possible with intersecting budgets such as the ones presented in
Figure 4. Essentially, without such intersecting budgets, it is not possible to distinguish
between intrinsic reciprocity (a preference) and strong reciprocity, a tendency to reward
kind behaviour and punish unkind behaviour (Fehr et al., 2002). Strong reciprocity may
reflect a preference (intrinsic), but it may also be the consequence of following a social
norm or a heuristic (as pointed out by Reuben and Suetens, 2018), because of the salience
of actions taken by others, or for some other reason.
The revealed preference condition we introduce and test is necessary and sufficient
for the existence of different (sub)utility functions depending on the kindness of the other
player, with the decision maker being more generous when the other player is more kind,
and more selfish when the other player is less kind. This means that the condition
exhausts the empirical implications of a preference for reciprocity.10
A decision maker having different preferences depending on the behaviour of others
means there are multiple preference relations according to which a person may choose.
In that sense, it is similar to random utility models. As our Agreement axiom essentially
characterises a single-crossing condition, the work on random utility models most closely
related to our paper is Apesteguia et al. (2017). Whereas they focus on the stochastic
choices function for random utility models with single-crossing utility, our result is on
the revealed preference implications and utility representation of single-crossing utility
as captured by our Agreement axiom. Adams et al. (2017) have a similar focus on the
revealed preference implications of different preference relations, but their model imposes
no restrictions on the data (‘anything goes’). Because our method allows for classifying
different revealed preference relations, it is also related to Crawford and Pendakur (2013)
10Apart from how beliefs are formed about the kindness of another player.
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and Castillo and Freer (2018). They focus on classifying groups of different preferences
relations, whereas we also have results on how these different preferences are related.
Cox et al. (2008) consider the nonparametric implications of different social preference
relations, under the assumption of the existence of differentiable utility functions that
represent preferences. If one preference relation is MAT (more altruistic than) the other
preference relation according to Cox et al.’s (2008) definition, then the two preference
relations satisfy our Agreement axiom. We do not assume the existence of utility functions
(differentiable or otherwise), but instead start from a behavioural axiom and derive a
revealed preference condition which is equivalent to the existence of utility functions that
satisfy our axiom.
6 Conclusion
We introduce a new axiom which we call Agreement to give empirical meaning to the idea
that one preference relation is more generous (or more selfish) than another preference
relation. The revealed preference condition we derive from this axiom generalises GARP
when preferences are context-specific, but where preferences in one context are informa-
tive about preferences in the another context. We show that if and only if data satisfies
our revealed preference condition, there exist utility functions, one of which is more selfish
than the other, that represent the preferences revealed by someone’s choices. The Agree-
ment axiom and the revealed preference implications we derive can be used to model
changing preferences whenever someone likes some particular good better in one context
than another, not only in social choice situations. Our revealed preference method allows
for predicting choices in one context based on choices observed in a different context and
for drawing conclusions about welfare.
Applying our revealed preference results to a social choice experiment, where the con-
text was generated by the kindness of another player, we find that people have consistent
preferences for a given level of kindness of the other player, but that their preferences are
different for different levels of kindness. Furthermore, we find that choices are largely con-
sistent with Agreement. Our findings provide support for the interpretation of reciprocal
behaviour as reflecting a preference.
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7 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. First, we show Agreement implies the alternate version. Proof
by contradiction. Suppose there exist x′, y′ such that x′ %A y′ and x′1 ≥ y′1 but y′ S x′.
Then by Agreement y′ A x′, a contradiction of the assumed preference relation x′ %A y′.
The proof that the alternative formulation implies Agreement works analogously.
Proof of Proposition 2. Since Ω satisfies GARP, by Varian (1982), there exist U i and
λi > 0, i = 1, ..., n such that for all x ∈ R2+,
U(x) = min
i≤n
(U i + λipi(x− xi))
Given x ∈ R2+, u : R2+ → R, such that U(u(x), u(x)) = U(x). Then u is the certainty
equivalent (CE) function that represents the same preference as U , moreover, for every
x ∈ R2+, min{x1, x2} ≤ u(x) ≤ max{x1, x2}. Now we show that u is continuous, strictly
increasing and quasiconcave, which is equivalent to showing that % represented by U is
continuous, strictly increasing and convex.
(1) U is continuous, so % is continuous.
(2) Let x = (x1, x2) ∈ R2+ and ε > 0, then for all i




(U i + λpi((x1 + ε, x2)− xi)) > min
i≤n
(U i + λpi(x− xi))
That is, x+ (ε, 0)  x. Similarly, we have x+ (0, ε)  x for all ε > 0.
(3) Given x, y ∈ R2+ with U(x) = U(y) and α ∈ (0, 1), then
U(αx+ (1− α)y) = min
i≤n
(U i + λpi((αx+ (1− α)y)− xi))
≥ αmin
i≤n
(U i + λpi(x− xi)) + (1− α) min
i≤n
(U i + λpi(y − xi))
= U(x) = U(y)
Thus, % is convex.
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Therefore, u is continuous, strictly increasing and quasiconcave.
In our model, Ω is two-dimensional. Then GARP can be simplified by the following
Theorem.
Theorem 2 (Theorem 1 of Banerjee and Murphy 2006). Given X ⊂ R2+, GARP is
equivalent to that xiR0xj not xjP 0xi.
Let Nε(x) = {a ∈ X : d(a, x) < ε} be the open neighbourhood of x, and let d be the
Euclidean distance. The interior of a set S, int S, is the set of all a ∈ S, such that there
exists εa such that Nεa(a) ⊂ S. The boundary of a set S is dS = {a ∈ S : a /∈ intS}. For
a finite set {s1, · · · , sn} = S ∈ X, the convex hull of S is






λi = 1 λi ∈ [0, 1] for all i}.
The convex monotonic hull of S is,
CMH(S) = CH({a ∈ X : a ≥ si for some i = 1, · · · , n}).
Let Z = {zi}ki=1 = {xi}ni=1 ∪ {yj}mi=1, and P = {ri}ki=1 be the set of corresponding prices
to Z and B(ri) = {a ∈ X : a · ri < 1}. We define RW (R̃0S, zm) to be the revealed
worse set of observation (zm, rm) according to the revealed preference R̃S. Specifically, if
(zm, rm) ∈ ΩS, RW (R̃
0
S, z




{a ∈ X : a · ri < 1, a1 ≤ zm1 }. Before proving Theorem 1, we first present two Lemmas.
Lemma 1. If Ω satisfies AG-GARP, then for all z0 ∈ Z, z0 ∈ dCMH({zi ∈ Z :
ziR̃Az
0}) and z0 ∈ dCMH({zi ∈ Z : ziR̃Sz0}).
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Assume that z0 /∈ dCMH({zi ∈ Z : ziR̃Sz0}). Let
C = CMH({zi ∈ Z : ziR̃Sz0}) , Z∗ = {zi ∈ Z : ziR̃Sz0} and Z̄ = Z ∩ dC. W.l.o.g., we
relabel indices of Z̄ = {z̄i}li=1 such that z̄i+11 < z̄i1 for i = 1, · · · , l − 1.
The Lemma holds trivially when Z = ∅. Suppose that Z 6= ∅. If z0 ∈ intC, then there
exist z̄i










i−1 for i ∈ {2, · · · , l}.

















1, then {z̄1, z̄2} ∈
dB(r1) and B(r1) = B(r2). Additionally, {z̄1, z̄1} ∈ dC, B(r1),B(r1) are supporting
hyperplanes of C. Then both z̄1 and z̄2 can only be preferred to other choices in C









3 holds the same as we derive z̄1R̃
0
S z̄




i ∈ {1, · · · , l − 1}.
Proof of Claim 2. We start from z̄l. Since z̄l ∈ dC, we must have z̄lR̃0S z̄j for some
z̄j ∈ C. Because z̄l1 < z̄i1 for all z̄i ∈ C, we cannot have z̄lR̃
0
Az̄
j. Thus, z̄l ∈ {xi}ni=1
and z̄lR0Az̄
j, then z̄lR0Az̄




i ∈ {2, · · · , l}.
(1) The boundary case: if i∗ = 1, then z̄1R̃
0
Sz
m. Since zm ∈ intC, there is z̄k ∈ Z̄, such
that zm ∈ int(CMH{z̄k}), that is zmP̃ 0S z̄2. Then we have z̄1P̃
0
S z̄




k, and we have a contradiction. A symmetric arguments applies for i∗ = l.
(2) If 1 < i∗ < l, then if zm1 < z̄
l
1, the contradiction is the same as for the boundary case
i∗ = l; otherwise it is the same as for i∗ = 1.
This finishes the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. Let CA = CMH({zi ∈ Z : ziR̃Az0}) and CS = CMH({zi ∈ Z : ziR̃Sz0}).
Let {zi}li=1 be the set of observed choices on dCA or dCS such that zi1 > zi+11 for
all i = 1, · · · , l − 1. If Ω satisfies AG-GARP then z1R̃0Az2, z2R̃
0
Az




























0 for some k ∈ {1, · · · , l}.
Proof. By Lemma 1, z0 ∈ dCA. There is zj ∈ {zi}li=1, such that (zj, z0) and (z0, zj+1) are













l−2, · · · , zj+1R̃0Az0 for some





























Violation of both GARP and AG-GARP
Figure 8: The relation between GARP and AG-GARP, where xi is chosen in context A
and yi is chosen in context S.
The Agreement axiom only allows one direction of violations of GARP (see Figure 8).
Observations in both figures violate GARP. However, if xi is chosen in context A and yi
is chosen in context S, Agreement allows such choices in the left figure but does not admit
those in the right figure. Lemma 1 shows that Agreement is still enough to conclude that
observations on the boundary of monotonic convex hull are revealed indifferent. Lemma
2 explains in detail the relation of observations on the boundary of monotonic convex
hull. Next we give the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. We only prove the sufficiency of AG-GARP to get the representation
in our Theorem.
Sketch of the proof. First we construct virtual budgets for every allocation in ΩS
such that these new bundles together with ΩA satisfy GARP and the extended revealed
relation is embedded in the new relation. Then by Proposition 2, we have a continuous,
monotonic and quasiconcave altruistic utility rationalising the data. Secondly, based on
the constructed altruistic utility we recover the budget for countable dense bundles in R2.
Lastly, we add these countable allocations with corresponding virtual budgets to those
observations in context S sequentially, and the limit is our desired selfish utility.
Suppose that AG-GARP is satisfied. We show the existence of the selfish utility
function. Start by adding allocation x1 into ΩS. That is, we construct a virtual budget,
p1∗, associated with x1 such that ΩS ∪ (x1, p1∗) satisfies GARP and R̃s is embedded in
27
the revealed relation from ΩS ∪ (x1, p1∗). We discuss the following two cases:
(1) If ΩS ∪ (x1, p1) satisfies GARP, then we let p1∗ = p1 and Ω1S = ΩS ∪ (x1, p1);
(2) Otherwise, Let Z1 = {yj}mj=1∪x1 and C = CMH({zi ∈ Z0 : ziR̃Sx1}), then x1 ∈ dC
by Lemma 1. Lemma 2 implies that if zi ∈ Z1 and x1 adjacent on dC, then ziR̃0Sx1.
AG-GARP implies that not x1R̃
0
Sz
i. Thus B(p1) ∩ intC = ∅. Then RW (R̃0S, x1) ∩
C = ∅. Both RW (R̃0S, x1) and C are convex, and by the separating hyperplane
theorem, the hyperplane separating RW (R̃
0
S, x
1) and C has the form of {a ∈ X :
(p11 + θ
1, p12)(a− x1) = 0} with some θ1 ≥ 0. Denote p1
∗
= (p11 + θ
1, p12). Note that for
all x ∈ X, x1P̃sx implies that x ∈ (R̃
0
S, x
1), that is x1 · p1∗ > x · p1∗. Thus, the new
bundle (x1, p1∗) keeps the information from context A.
We repeat this for (x2, p2). We add (x2, p2
∗




∗}ni=1 and Ω∗S satisfies GARP. In the same way, we have ΩmA = ΩA∪{yj, qj
∗}mj=1
and Ω∗A satisfies GARP. Let F0 = {xi}ni=1 ∪ {yj}mj=1.
Because Ω∗A and Ω
∗
S satisfy GARP, by proposition 2 there exist continuous, strictly
increasing and quasiconcave utility functions u and v0 that rationalise these sets of (vir-
tual) observations. Moreover, because the revealed preference relations on Ω∗A and Ω
∗
S
satisfy Agreement by construction, for all x, y ∈ F0, u(x) ≥ (>)u(y) with x1 ≥ y1 implies
that v0(x) ≥ (>) v0(y).
Let {αi}∞i=1 be the countable rational dense of R2+, Fk = {α1, · · · , αk} and F∞ =
{α1, · · · , αk, · · · }.
Lemma 3. Given Fk, there exist two sets of prices {li}ki=1 and {l′i}ki=1 such that Ω∗A ∪
{αi, li}ki=1 and Ω∗S ∪ {αi, l′i}ki=1 satisfy GARP and jointly satisfy Agreement.
Proof. We adopt the idea of the proof of Lemma 2 in Reny (2015), based on u, there are
virtual prices li corresponding to α
i for all i, such that Ω∗A ∪ {αi, li}ki=1 satisfies GARP
and u rationalises Ω∗A ∪ {αi, li}ki=1.
Then we show that Ω∗A∪{αi, li}ki=1 and Ω∗S satisfies Agreement. Assume for contradic-
tion that Agreement is violated, then there is some (αt, lt), (β, q′) ∈ Ω∗Aand (β, q∗) ∈ Ω∗S,
such that at least one of the following is true:
(a) ltαt ≥ ltβ and q∗β > q∗αt with αt1 ≥ β1;
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(b) ltαt > ltβ and q∗β ≥ q∗αt with αt1 ≥ β1;
Assume (a) holds, that is, ltαt ≥ ltβ and q∗β > q∗αt with αt1 ≥ β1. Since q∗β > q∗αt,
then q′β > q′αt since αt1 ≥ β1 and q∗ put more weight on first coordinate than q′.
Together with ltαt ≥ ltβ, GARP is violated in Ω∗A, a contradiction. Similarly, we can
obtain a contradiction of statement (b). Therefore, Ω∗A ∪ {αi, li}ki=1 and Ω∗S satisfies
Agreement.
Next, we apply the techniques we used before to construct virtual budgets so that
there are l′i corresponding to αi for all i, so Ω
∗
S ∪ {αi, l′i}ki=1 satisfies GARP, and the
construction guarantees that agreement is satisfied.
We denote ΩkA = Ω
∗
A ∪ {αi, li}ki=1 and ΩkS = Ω∗S ∪ {αi, l′i}ki=1. Both ΩkA and ΩkS satisfy
GARP, and they jointly satisfy Agreement.
Lemma 4. There exists a continuous, strictly increasing and quasiconcave vk that ra-
tionalises ΩkS such that for all x, y ∈ F0 ∪ Fk with x1 ≥ y1, u(x) ≥ (>) u(y) implies
vk(x) ≥ (>) vk(y), and for all x, y ∈ F0 ∪ Fk with x1 ≤ y1, vk(y) ≥ (>) vk(x) implies
u(x) ≥ (>) u(y)
Proof. By Lemma 3, the virtual budgets {αi, li}ki=1 are constructed according to u, thus u
rationalises ΩkA. Since Ω
k
S satisfies GARP, Proposition 2 implies that there is a continuous,
strictly increasing and quasiconcave vk that rationalises Ω
k
S. The relation of the two
utilities can be derived in the same way as before.






where N is a natural number and the operator works in the following way: given a natural
number N , take the infimum of vk over the set of {k ≥ N}, and then take the supremum
over all natural numbers N . Every vk is a certainty equivalent function, so {vk}k∈N are
uniformly bounded and so is v, for all x ∈ X, min{x1, x2} ≤ v(x) ≤ max{x1, x2}. We
now show some properties of v.
(i) v is continuous.
Since vk is continuous for all k, v is continuous.
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(ii) u and v AG-rationalises Ω.
For all k, altruistic utility u and selfish utility vk AG-rationalises Ω = ΩA∪ΩS, then
for very x, y ∈ Ω, xR̃sy implies that vk(x) ≥ vk(y). That is, given x, y ∈ Ω, xR̃sy
implies that the inequality
vk(x) ≥ vk(y)










Therefore, u and supN infk≥N(vk) AG-rationalises Ω.
(iii) v is quasiconcave .
Given x, y ∈ X and λ ∈ (0, 1),
vk(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≥ min{vk(x), vk(y)} holds for all natural k
⇒ inf
k≥N


































⇒ v(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≥ min{v(x), v(y)}.
Next we show the following Lemma, which extends Lemma 4 to an infinite number of
virtual observations.
Lemma 5. For all x, y ∈ X, u(x) (≥) > u(y) with x1 ≥ y1 implies that v(x) ≥ (>) v(y)
Proof. The proof is done in two steps.
(a) First we show for all x, y ∈ F∞, u(x) ≥ (>)u(y) with x1 ≥ y1 implies that v(x) ≥ (>)
v(y). Given x, y ∈ {αi}∞i=1, u(x) ≥ u(y) with x1 ≥ y1, there exists N∗ such that for
all N ≥ N∗, x, y ∈ FN , we have
















vFk(y), that is, v(x) ≥ v(y).
Given x, y ∈ {αi}∞i=1, v(y) ≥ v(x) with x1 ≥ y1, there exists N∗ such that for all
N ≥ N∗, x, y ∈ FN . Assume for contradiction that there is K ≥ N∗, vK(y) <
vK(x), then for all N ≥ K, vN(y) < vN(x), that is v(y) < v(x). Thus, for all
K ≥ N∗,vK(y) ≥ vK(x). By Lemma 4, u(y) ≥ u(x).
Assume for contradiction that there are x, y ∈ F∞, such that u(x) > u(y) with
x1 ≥ y1 and v(x) ≤ v(y). By the previous argument, v(x) ≤ v(y) and x1 ≥ y1 implies
that u(y) ≥ u(x), we have contradiction.
(b) The relation between u and v holds for F∞, so what is left is to show that for all x, y ∈
X and not x, y ∈ F∞, u(x) ≥ (>) u(y) with x1 ≥ y1 implies that v(x) ≥ (>) v(y).
Given irrational x, y ∈ X, u(x) ≥ u(y) with x1 ≥ y1, there exist a rational decreasing
sequence {an}∞n=1 and increasing sequence {bn}∞n=1 that satisfy limn→∞ an = x and
limn→∞ b
n = y. Then we have u(an) ≥ u(x) ≥ u(y) ≥ u(bn) with an1 ≥ bn1 for all n, so
v(an) ≥ v(bn) for all n. The continuity of v implies






v(bn) = v( lim
n→∞
bn) = v(y).
Given irrational x, y ∈ X, u(x) > u(y) with x1 ≥ y1, there exist a rational increas-
ing sequence {an}∞n=1 and decreasing sequence {bn}∞n=1 that satisfy u(a1) > u(b1),
limn→∞ a
n = x and limn→∞ b
n = y. Then we have u(an) > u(bn) with an1 ≥ bn1 for all
n, so v(an) > v(bn) for all n. The continuity of v implies




v(an) ≥ v(a1) > v(b1) ≥ lim
n→∞
v(bn) = v( lim
n→∞
bn) = v(y).
Let x, y ∈ X with x > y (x ≥ y and [either x1 > y1 or x2 > y2]), then u(x) > u(y).
By Lemma 5, we have v(x) > v(y), that is, v is strictly increasing. Therefore, there exist
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continuous, strictly increasing and quasiconcave altruistic utility u(x) and selfish utility
v(x) that AG-rationalises Ω. Moreover, for all x, y ∈ X, u(x) ≥ u(y) with x1 ≥ y1 implies
that v(x) ≥ v(y) and for all x, y ∈ X, v(x) ≥ v(y) with x1 ≤ y1 implies that u(x) ≥ u(y).
This finishes the proof.
The following proposition states that two preferences %1 is MAT %2 implies that
preferences %1 and %2 satisfies Agreement.
Proposition 3. Given two preference relations %1 and %2 on X, represented by differ-
entiable and monotonic utility functions u and v respectively, if %1 MAT %2 then %1 and
%2 satisfy agreement.
Proof. If %1 and %2 satisfy agreement and %1 is more altruistic, x %1 y with x1 ≥ y1
implies that x %2 y for all x, y ∈ X. Both %1 and %2 have utility representations u and v
respectively, thus it is equivalent to show that if %1 MAT %2 then u(x) ≥ (>)u(y) with
x1 ≥ y1 implies that v(x) ≥ (>)v(y) for all x, y ∈ X.
Given x ∈ X, let fx : R+ → R+, fx(x1) = x2 and u(a, fx(a)) = k for some constant
k > 0 for all a ∈ R+. That is, fx denote the indifference curve of preference %1 through
x ∈ X. Similarly let gx be the indifference curve of preference %2 through x ∈ X. By the
definition of MAT, %1 MAT %2 implies that f ′x(a) ≥ g′x(a) for all a ∈ R+ and x ∈ X.
Choose any x, y ∈ X with x1 ≥ y1 and u(x) ≥ u(y). We have fx(y1) ≥ y2. Define
Fx(a) = fx(a) − gx(a) , then F ′x(a) = f ′x(a) − g′x(a) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ R+, so Fx is non-
decreasing. Moreover, since Fx(x1) = fx(x1) − gx(x1) = x2 − x2 = 0 and x1 ≥ y1,
Fx(y1) = fx(y1)− gx(y1) ≤ 0, that is, fx(y1) ≤ gx(y1). Thus we have gx(y1) ≥ y2, and so
v(x) ≥ v(y). The proof is similar if we replace the weak inequalities by strict ones.
Theorem 3. Suppose %A and %S are represented by CES functions, that is, u(z) =
(αAz
ρA
1 + (1 − αA)z
ρA
2 )
1/ρA for %A and v(z) = (αSz
ρS
1 + (1 − αS)z
ρS
2 )
1/ρS for %S . Then
Agreement is satisfied if and only if αA ≤ αS and ρA = ρS.




1 + (1− αA)x
ρ
2)





Since x1 > y1 and αA ≤ αS, then
v(x) = (αSx
ρ
1 + (1− αS)x
ρ
2)




Thus, we have x %S y.
⇒Assume that Agreement holds. First we show that Agreement implies that marginal
rate of substitution (MRS) of the altruistic preference is smaller than that of selfish
preference. Given ε > 0, λ(ε) is the value such that the following indifference holds:
(x+ ε, y) ∼A (x, y + λ(ε)) (3)
By Agreement, 3 implies that
(x+ ε, y) %S (x, y + λ(ε)) (4)
We write 3 and 4 in utility functions,
u(x+ ε, y) = u(x, y + λ(ε))⇒ v(x+ ε, y) ≥ v(x, y + λ(ε)),
which is equivalent to,
u(x+ ε, y)− u(x, y)
ε
=
u(x, y + λ(ε))− u(x, y)
λ(ε)
⇒ v(x+ ε, y)− v(x, y)
ε













































Then a1 ≥ a2 and ρA = ρS.
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